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INTR.ODUCilON

In 1996, the United States Supreme Court decidedML.B. v. S.L.J, 1 its most
recent decision concerning termination ofparental rights. 2 The Court held that
where a state provides an appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights,
it must, under the U.S. Constitution's due process and equal protection

•A.uociatc Professor, University ofMaine School ofLaw; B.A., Yale College; J.D., Harvard
Law School. Thanks to Katharine K. Baker, Naomi R. Cahn, Scott Gould, Lois Lupica and Dean
Colleen Khoury for reading drafts; John McDuff and Rick Moore for providing background
information; Dennis Carrillo, Tanya Floerchinger, Karen Kimball and Rebekah Smith for research
usistanoe; and Ruth Miner for administrative assistance. Thanks also to the Law and Society
Association for an opportunity to present an early version of this work at its 1998 Annual
Meeting, the New Words Salon for an opportunity to present an early version, and the University
of Maine School of Law for research funding. I want to particularly thank my colleague Lois
Lupica at University ofMaine School ofLaw for her support and insights. Responsibility for any
CJTOI'1, is of course, mine.

1. 519 u.s. 102 (1996).
2. The M.L.B. v. S.L.J. decision was 6-3, with Justice Kennedy concurring. /d. at 128.
Justice Thomas and Justice Rehnquist tiled separate dissenting opinions. /d. at 129. Justice Scalia
jeined Justice Thomas' dissent; Justice Rehnquistjoined in part in Justice Thomas• dissent /d.
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mandates, provide indigent appellants with a transcript if a transcript is
necessary to review the decision? To reach this result, Justice Ginsburg, writing
for the majority, bad to navigate unfavorable precedentholdingthat due process
did not require states to provide an appeal4 and that indigent parents did not
have an absolute rightto counsel in terminationofparental rights cases.5 ML.B.
strongly endorses parental rights against state authority, and on remand, the
Mississippi courts ultimately reversed the initial tennination ofthe petitioner's
parental rights.6 Similarly, the Supreme Court's recent plurality decision in
Troxel v. Granville,' involving the constitutionality ofWashington state's third
party visitation statute in the context ofgrandparent visitation, also endorsed
parental rights.8 Troxel, however, involved very different circumstances, and
its ultimate significance is not clear because of the splintered nature of the
decision.9

3. /d. at 107. States were not required to provide an appeal, but once they did, they could
not deny indigent defendants a transcript. !d. at 111, 128.
4. /d. at 110-11. See Griffin v.Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (plurality opinion) (holding
states are not constitutionally required to provide appellate review in civil cases).
S. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 117-18. See Lassiterv. Dept. of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18,31-32
(1981) (stating parents have no absolute right to counsel in termination ofparental rights cases;
right depends on character and diflicuJty ofcase).
6. Following the Supreme Court,s remand, ML.B., armed with a transcript, was able to
successfully appeal the tennioation ofparentalrights decision. See M.L.B. v. SLJ., No. 97-CA
00929-COA, 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 299, at *40 (Miss. Ct. App. May 18, 1999). This was
recently affamed by the Mississippi Supreme Court. M,L.B. v. S.LJ., No. 97-CT-00929-SCT,
2000 Miss. LEXIS 93 (Miss. Apri120, 2000). See infra notes 76-79, 96-115.
7. 120 S.Ct. 2054 (2000) (plurality opinion).
8. /d at2057.
9. In Troxel, a plurality of the United States Supreme Court found that Washington's
broadly worded third party visitation statute, as applied in that case, was an unconstitutionaJ
infringement ofa parent's right to raise her children without state interference.ld. at 2063. The
Wasbington Supreme Court had held that the statute was unconstitutionaJ on its face under federal
law because it was oyerbroad and did not require a showing ofharm to a child before vi~itation
could be ordered.ld. at 2058-59. At the United States Supreme Court level, the plurality offour
justices, in an opinion written by Justice O'Connor, found the law was unconstitutional as applied
to the dispute at hand. ld. at 2063. The dispute was between a mother and the parents of her
deceased boyfriend, over the extent ofthe grandparents' visitation with the children.Jd. at 2057.
The trial court had ordered more visitation to the grandparents than the mother wanted to allow.
/d at 2057-58. There had been no cJaim that the mother was unfit, the trial court had given no
weightto the mother's evaJuation ofthe children's interest. and the mother was not seeking to cut
off visitation entirely. /d. at2061-63. As appJied to these circumstances, where the trial court hod
ordered a specific visitation schedule for the grandparents, the plurality held that the law
unconstitutionally infringed on the mother's parental rights. Jd. at 2063. The concurrences of
Justices Souter and Thomas took contrasting positions, with Justice Souter saying that the
Washington Supreme Court should have affirmed the lower court's holding that the statute was
overbroad and facially unconstitutional because it interfered with parents• rights as set forth in
Supreme Court precedents. Jd. at 2065-2067. Justice Thomas' concurrence argued that strict
scrutiny should have been applied to the statute since it interfered with fundamental rights and
also noted that the validity ofthe parental rights precedents had not been challenged, implying that
be might find those precedents incorrectly decided. It!. at 2067-68. Justice Scalia dissented,
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The purpose ofthis Essay is to examine and raise questions about certain
aspects of the Court's ML.B. decision which are distinct from the narrowly
doctrinal aspects ofthe decision. 10 The goal is not to assert that the decision is
"right'' or "wrong," but rather to discuss family law issues related to the
decision in light ofthe Supreme Court's decision and subsequent decisions in
the case. The Court's decision and contemporary family law more generally
make certain core assumptions. These assumptions include the following: (1)
child custody decisionmaking11 is fundamentally different from tennination of
parental rights decisionmaking; (2) the advocacy system is the best forum for
deciding termination of parental rights disputes; (3) stepparent adoptions are

arguing that the matter should be left to the states.Id at 2074-75. Justices Kennedy and Stevens
wrote separate dissents, both arguing that the lower court's decision should be reversed.Id at

2075-79 (Kennedy), and 2068-74 (Stevens) . As Troxel dealt with grandparent visitation rather
than tennination ofparental rights, it is not directly on point. Moreover, the narrow wording of
the plurality decision, discussing the statute only "as applied," and the divergent analysis ofthe
concurrenoes limits its significanoe in this context. However, both decisions pertain to parental
rights, and the language of the Troxel opinion is interesting in light of the M.L.B. decision so
Troxel will be discussed herein to the extent that it is pertinent.
10. The strictly constitutional aspects ofthe decision have been discussed elsewhere. See
generally Lloyd C. Anderson, The Constitutional Right ofPoor People to Appeal Without
Payment ofFees: Convergence ofDue Process and Equal Protection in M.L.B. v. S.LJ., 32 U.
MICH. J. L. REFoRM 44 I (1999) (stating that M.LB. expands the constitutional right ofcost-free
appeal to a limited range of civil cases); Robert B. McDuff, M.L.B. V. S.LJ. and the Right of
Poor People to Go to Court, 18 MISS. C. L. REV. 5 (1997) (discussing M.L.B. in the context of
constitutional law and indigents' access to court); Rick Moore, M.L.B. v. S.LJ.: Extension of
in fonna pauperis .Appeals to the Civil Arena in Termination ofParental Rights Cases, 18 Mrss.
C. L. REv. 19 (1997) (describing the majority opinion as an amalgamation ofthe Due Process
Clause and Equal Protection Clause); Julie A. Nice, The Emerging Third Strand in Equal
Protection Jurisprudence: Recognizingthe Co-Constitutive Nature ofRights and Classes, 1999
U. ILL. L. REv.1209 (finding thatM.L.B. can be better understood by including an evaluation of
the interaction between rights and classes to typical equal protection jurisprudence); J.T. Price,
Re~nt Development, An Improper Extension ofCivil Litigation by Indigents: M.L.B. v. S.LJ.,
117 S. Ct. 555 (1996), 20 HAR.v.J.L.&PuB.POL'Y 905 (1997) (giving a detailed summary ofthe
opinion); Jason T. Jacoby, Note, ML.B. v. S.LJ.: "Equal Justice"for Indigent Parents, 32 U.
RlCH. L. REv. 571 (1998) (noting that the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause apply
in parental rights termination proceedings for indigents); Sundeep Kothari, Comment, AndJustice
for All: 171e Role Equal Protection and Due Process Principles Have Played in Providing
Indigentl with Meaningful Access to the CoUJ'IS, 72 TUL. L. REv. 2159 (1998) (suggesting that
a combination of due process and equal protection principles have driven the expansion of
indigent rights).
11. "Child custody decisionmaking" refers to decisions concerning which legalJyrecognized
parent shall Jive with the child and which legally recognized parent shalJ visit with the child. The
tenn does not refer to the means by which someone can be recognized as a legal parent. See, e.g.,
E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999)(stating the probate court had equity jurisdiction
to grant visitation between child and de facto parent), cert. denied 120 S.Ct. 500 (1999). Nor does
the tenn refer to decisions related to custody orvisitation ofa child by grandparents or others who
are not legally recognized as parents. Similarly, "child custody disputes" refers to disputes
concerning which legally recognized parent shall live with the child and which legalJy recognized
parent shall visit with the child.
·

-- --- --. --------- .. --- ----·-- ........ ~~
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essentially the same as non-"stepparent adoptions; and (4) children's interests
are often overlooked in the applicable analytical framework. This Essay
challenges these assumptions. As close examination ofthe facts inML.B. will
show, these assumptions are ill-fitted to the facts offamily situations in many
instances. In fact, an examination of the relationship between the ML.B.
decision and the aforementioned assumptionsindicates the need forsuggestions
with a different focus. For instance, providing legal assistance for indigent
parents in custody litigation, consideringopenadoption in stepparent adoptions,
and paying more attention to the legal status ofchildren are ideas that may lead
to the development of more nuanced, child-centered ways ofthinking about
parental rights.
Part n ofthis Essay highlights pertinent aspects ofthe ML.B. decision and
analyzes the doctrinal aspects ofthe decision. Part III discusses and questions
key assumptions made in the ML.B. decision and in contemporary family law
and suggests other approaches that should be considered.

II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN ML.B. v. S.L.J.

AND SUBSEQUENT

CASE HISTORY

AlthoughML.B. v. S.L.J. wasaterminationofparentalrightscase, it arose
in the aftermath of a divorce and in conjunction with a remarriage and
adoption. 12 M.L.B. and S.L.J. were married for almost eight years before
divorcing in June 1992.13 They had one child born in April1985 and one child
born in February 1987.14 Following the divorce, the children remained in their
father' s custody, which was agreed upon at the time of the divorce.' 5 In
September 1992, S.L.J., the children's father, remarried, and the children
continued to live with him.16 In November 1993, S.L.J. and his new wife J.P.J.
filed a petition to terminate M.L.B.'s parental rights17 and to allow for J.P.J.'s
adoption of the children, who were six and eight years old at the time ofthe

12. M.L.B. v. S.LJ., 519 U.S. 102, 107 (1996). This ls a typical situation for a large
proportion of adoptions. See MARGARET M. MAHONEY, STEPFAMJUES AND THE LAW, 161·63
(1994).
13. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 107.
14. /d.
15. /d.
16. /d.
17. I d. Under Mississippi law, an adoption petition can be filed by an unmanied person or
a manied couple. MISS. Coo£ ANN. § 93-17-3 (1994 & Supp. 2000). A parent can voluntarily
relinquish parental rights and consent to an adoption. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-15-103(2) (1994 &
Supp. 2000). The parental rights ofone parent can be terminated without terminating the parental
rights ofthe other parent. Miss . CODE ANN.§ 93-15-109 (1994 & Supp. 2000). 1fthe parental
rights ofa parent have been terminated, the parent shall not be heard in the adoption proceeding.
Mtss . CoDE ANN. § 93-17-7 (Supp. ~000).
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petition. 18 Under the conventional system., the parental rights ofthe biological
parents must be tenninated in order for an adoption to go forward. 19 The
petition alleged that M.L.B. had not exercised her visitation rights and still
owed child support.20 M..L.B. counterclaimed, alleging that S.L.J. had not
allowed her reasonable visitation in violationofthe divorce decree and seeking
primazy custody of the cbildren.21 Prior to filing the counterclaim to the
termination petition, M.L.B. had not asked the court to enforce the divorce
decree to allow her visitation.22
After a hearing, which took place on three separate days between the
summer and fall of 1994, the Chancellor in December 1994 terminated
M.L.B.'s parental rights, ordered the adoption by J.P.J., and ordered that the
children's birth certificates show J.P.J. as their mother.23 This is standard
Mississippi procedure for adoptions24 as well as thestandardprocedure in other
states.25 Mississippi law provides that parental rights may be terminated ''when
there is [a] substantial erosion ofthe relationship between the parent and child
which was caused at least in part by the parent's serious neglect, abuse,
prolonged and unreasonable absence, unreasonable failure to visit or
communicate, or prolonged imprisonment"26

18. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 107 {1996). SLJ. must consent to the adoption ofthe children by
J.PJ. and himself; the adoption could then take effect immediately, assuming M.L.B.'s parental
rights already had been terminated. The adoption decree may be entered immediately ifa child is
the stepchild of a petitioner or is related by blood to the petitioner within the third degree or in
some other circumstances. Miss. CoDE ANN.§ 93-17-13 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
19. An adoption cannot take place if any parent whose parental rights have not been
terminated objects. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-7 {Supp. 2000). For a discussion of adoption
prooeed'mgs requiring termination of parental rights see MAHONEY, supra note 12, at 163-64;
MargarctM. Mahoney, OpenAdoption in Context: The Wisdom andEnforceabilityofVisitation
OrderzforFormer Parents Under Uniform AdoptionAct§ 4-1I 3, 51 FLA.L. REv. 89, 92 {1999);
and Philip S. Welt, Adoption and the Constitution: Are Adoptive Parents Really "Strangers
Without Rights"? 1995 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 165, 174-77. As Mahoney notes, adoption by a
stepparent generally takes place through the joint Petition ofthe stepparent and the biological
parent to whom the stepparent is married. MAHONEY, supra note 12, at 161-63. Even though a
court tccbnically may temporarily terminate the parental rights of the biological parent who is
married to the stepparent, the biological parent's rights are reestablished through the granting of
the petition. The adoption by the stepparent will not affe.ct the legal or custodial relationship
between the child and the biological parent who is married to the stepparent. MAHONEY, supra
note 12, at 163-64.
20. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 107.
21. /d.
22. ML.B. v. S.W.• No. 97-CA-00929-COA, 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 299, at *6 (Miss.
Ct. App. May 18, 1999); see infra notes 96-101.
23. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 107-08.
24. See Miss. CODE ANN.§ 93-17-21 (1994) (detailing how to revise birth certificates).
25. See Annette Ruth Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption: Implications for
Collaborative Adoption Law andPractice, 15 B,U. L. REv. 997, 1007 n.40 (1995) (referencing
methods ofrevising birth certificates in various states).
26. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 108 n.1 {citing Miss. CODEANN. § 93-15-103(3) {1994))..
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In the Chancellor's written order terminating M.L.B.'s parental rights and
allowing the adoption, the Chancellor echoed the statutory language, stating
that there had been a '"substantial erosion of the relationship between the
natural mother ... and the minor children' which had been caused 'at least in
part by [M.L.B. 's] serious neglect, abuse, prolonged and unreasonable absence
or unreasonable failure to visit or communicate with her minor children., 27
The Chancellor further found that S.L.J. and J.P.J. had met their burden of
proof by clear and convincing evidence28 in accordance with the required
evidentiary standard.29 The Chancellor made a lengthy oral order from the
bench, but because M.L.B. could not afford the transcript, she was not able to
use the order in her initial appea1.30
M.L.B. appealed and paid the $100 filing fee, but was not able to pay the
$2352.36 transcript preparation fee.31 Mississippi law provides that "if the
appellant 'intends to urge on appeal,' as M.L.B. did, 'that a finding or
conclusion is unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the evidence"' the
appellant must order and pay for the relevant parts of the transcript.32 The
guardian ad litem, who was appointed in accordance with Mississippi law to
protect the children's interests in this matter/3 did not appeal the Chancellor's
decision?• The Mississippi Supreme Court denied M.L.B. 's application to

27. Jd. at 107-08. Justice Ginsburg noted the brevity of the lower court's order that was
available to the Supreme Court: "Nothing in the Chancellor's order describes the evidence,
however, or otherwise reveals precisely why M.L.B. was decreed, forevennore, a stranger to her
children." Jd. at 108; see infra note 30.
28. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 108.
29. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (holding thot decisions tenninating
parental rights must be based on clear and convincing evidence).
30. ML.B., 519 U.S. at 108·09. The Mississippi Appeals Court decision following the
United States Supreme Court decision sets forth in full the Chancellor's fact-finding and decision.
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., No. 97-CA·00929-COA, 1999 Miss. App. LEXJS 299, at •5-28 (Miss. Ct. App.
May 18, 1999).
31. MLB., 519 U.S. at 108·09.
32. !d. Mississippi law states a party can make a motion for fmdings offact and conclusions
of Jaw after a court has issued its decision, and if a party makes such a motion, the court must
issue fmdings andconclusions. Mlss.R. Crv.P. 52. However, the court's fmdings and conclusions
need not be in writing. Conversation with John McDuff, Esq. (January 21, 2000). It is not clear
whether M.L.B. made such a motion after reviewing the Chancellor's brief decision. Efforts to
reach ML.B.'s counsel were unsuccessful. Even if she had made such a motion, the court's
findings might have been oral. and thus a transcript would have been necessary to review them.
In any event, the Chancellor did issue a lengthy oral order. See supra note 30.
33. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93·15·107(1) (Supp. 2000) (requiring appointment of a guardion
ad litem "to protect the interest ofthe child in the tennination of parental rights" proceedings).
There is tremendous variation betweenstates concerning representation ofchildren in termination
ofparental rights proceedings and child protective proceedings generally. SeeJEANKOHPETER.S,
REPRESENTING C HILDREN IN CHILD PROlECTIVE PROCEEDINGS: E1li1CAL AND PRACTICAL

DIMENSIONS§ 2·3(b), at24-33, app. B, at255-477 {1997).
34. M.L.B. v. S.LJ., No. 95-853, 1996 WL 587663, at •23, •29 {1996) (transcriptoforol
lirgwnent before the United States Supreme Court).
·
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proceed informa pauperis, and, th~ M.L.B. could not pursue her appeal as the
state would not pay for the transcript3s
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether "a State, consistent with
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses ofthe Fourteenth Amendment,
[may) condition appeals from trial court decrees terminating parental rights on
the affected parent's ability to pay record preparation fees."36 In resolving this
issue, Justice Ginsburg analyzed the nature ofthe decrees terminating parental
rights.37
In analyzing the issue of whether the state had to pay for M.L.B's
transcript, Justice Ginsburg highlighted the "narrow category ofcivil cases in
which the State must provide access to its judicial processes without regard to
a party's ability to pay court fees."38 She noted that cases "involving state
controls or intrusions on family relationships" are treated differently from other
civil cases.39 In such contexts, "to guard against undue official intrusion, the
Court bas examined closely and contextually the importance of the
governmental interest advanced in defense ofthe intrusion."40 Justice Ginsburg
thus referred to the equation as "government interest'' versus "family
relationship."
Justice Ginsburg also cited two criminal cases as precedent Griffin v.
Rlinoi:l 1 and Mayer v. Chicago42 require that a state providing an appeal from
criminal convictions, including misdemeanor convictions, cannot bar indigents
from the appeal process.43 Justice Ginsburg, characterizing Mayer, stated that
"[a]n impectmious party ... whether found guilty ofa felony or conduct only

35. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 109. The Mississippi Supreme Court's decision denying her
application to proceed in forma pauperis was unreported. Petitioner's Brief at *1, M.L.B. v.
S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (No. 95-853), available at 1996 WL 291022. At least thirty-one
states provided transcripts for parental rights tenninat:ion appeals. M.LB., 519 U.S. at 122 n.l3.
According to the petitioner, only Mississippi took the position that in forma pauperis appeals
were not allowed in civil cases. Petitioner's Brief at *26-27, M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102
( 1996) (No. 95-853), available at 1996 WL 291022.
36. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 107.
37. /d. at 113-19.lhesearecivil casesanddonotinvolvethethreatofincarceration oreven
a fine./d.
38. /d. at113. Filing fees in civil cases genenilly do not raise due process implications.Jd.
at 1l.J-16.
39. /d. at 116; 3ee also Boddie v. Connecticut. 401 U.S. 371,374 (1971) (holding that it
was a due process violation for the state to deny a divorce to a manied couple based on their
inability to pay court costs because oftheir fundamental interest at stake in the marriage and the
''state monopolization ofthe means for legally dissolving this relationshipj.
40. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 116 (citation omitted).
41. 351 U.S. 12 {1956) (overturning an Illinois rule that required aU indigent defendants
except those sentenced to death to pay for a transcript in order to appeal their convictions).
42. 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (extending the Griffin rule to misdemeanor defendants).
· 43. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 110-12.
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'quasi criminal in natme' 'cannot be denied a record ofsufficient completeness
to permit proper [appellate] consideration ofhis claims."*'
Expanding on the constitutional protections for families, she restated the
principle that "[c]hoices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of
children are among associa1ional rights this Court has ranked as 'of basic
importance in our society,' rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment
against the State's unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect.' 145 She
cited familiar precedents regarding marriage,46 procreation,•7 and raising
children.•8 She characterized M.L.B. 's case as "involving the State's authority
to sever permanently a parent-child bond'149 and stated that the Court
approached the case "mindful of the gravity of the sanction imposed on
[M.L.B.] and in light of two prior decisions most immediately in point,"50
referencing the due process precedents of Lassiter v. Department ofSocial
Servicer 1 and Santos/cy v. Kramer. 51
In a footnote, Justice Ginsburg remarked that though "the termination
proceeding . . . was initiated by private parties as a prelude to an adoption
petition, rather than by a state agency, the challenged state action remains
essentially the same: M.L.B. resists the imposition of an official decree
extinguishing, as no power other than the State can, her parent-child
relationships." 53 To Ginsburg, the dilemma is simply governmental interest
versus family relationship, despite the private origins of the issue in a
breakdown of a marriage.
Justice Ginsburg then highlighted aspects of Lassiter and Santos/cy which
emphasize the importance of the parents' interests over the state's interest.
Although Lassiter held that indigent parents did not have an automatic right to
counsel in cases involving termination of parental rights,s.. it emphasized the
importance of parents' interests in companionship with and custody of their
children.55 A decision terminating parental rights mwork[s] a unique kind of
deprivation.' For that reason, '[a] parent's interest in the accuracy and justice
of the decision . • • is • . . a commanding one."'56 The Court in Santosley

44. ld. at 112 (citing Mayer, 404 U.S. at 196, 198).
45 . Jd. at 116 (citation omitted).
46. /d. (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
0978), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
47. /d. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)).
48. lei. (citing Pierce v. Soc'y ofSisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) and Meyerv. Nebraska, 262

u.s. 390 (1923)).
49. M.LB., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996) (footnote omitted).
so. lei. at 117.
51. 452 u.s. 18 0981).
52. 455 u.s. 745 (1982).
53.
54.
55.
56.

M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 116 n.8.

lei. at 117 (citing lAssiter, 452 U.S. at 31 -32).
/d. at 117-18 (citing .Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27).
Jd. at 118 (quoting lassiter, 452 U.S. at27).
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characterized the parents' interests as "far more precious than any property
right."S7
Having laid the foundation, Justice Ginsburg turned to the issue ofhow to
classify M.L.B.'s situation. The situation could either be categorized as a
general civil case, in which the indigent would have no right to proceed without
fees, or it could be in the free-transcript category ofMayer v. City ofChicago58
because the "accusatory state action [M.L.B.] is trying to fend off is barely
distinguishable from criminal condemnation in view of the magnitude and

57. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982). Santosky articulated general
agreement (even from the dissenters) that ''the interest ofparents in their relationship with their
children is sufficiently fundamental to come within the finite class ofliberty interests protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id at 774 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), quotedin M.L.B., 519 U.S.
at 119. In M.L.B. Justice Ginsburg also referred to a distinction between ''the State's termination
of a fully existing parent-child relationship., and ''the State's imposition ofthe legal obligations
attending a biological relationship between parent and child." ML.B., 519 U.S. at 118 n.ll. A
later case held that paternity cases could be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. See
Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 575 (1987). For discussion of the issues of paternity and
developing parent-child relationships, see generally Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 424 (1998)
(upholding statutory distinctions in citizenship requirements for children hom out ofwedlock in
foreign lands which treat children ofan alien father and citizen mother different from those ofan
alien JDGther and citizen father); Lehrv. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248,267-68 (1983) (holding a state
may aooonl different rights to parents if"one parent has an established custodial relationship with
the child and the other parent has either abandoned or never established a relationship" with the
child (feotnote omitted)); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 382,394 (1979) (holding a New
York adoption law unconstitutional as it distinguished between the rights ofunwed mothers and
unwed fathers by providing for the adoption of an illegitimate child solely by the consent ofthe
mother); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (upholding the constitutionality of
Georgia adoption laws denying an unwed father the power to prevent the adoption ofhis child and
the state's recognition ofthe "difference in the extent ofcommitment to the welfare ofthe child"
of an un\Wd father compared to a married father); and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658
(1972) (holding "parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their
children are removed from their custody"). For consideration ofproblems withthe child protective
system, see generally Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender,
Race, and Class in the Child Protection System: An Essay, 48 S.C. L. REv. 577 (1997) (arguing
children's needs are often not met by the various child protective systems); and Amy Sinden,
"Why Won 't Mom Cooperate?" A Critique ofInformality in Child Welfare Proceedings, 11
YALEJ.L.&FEMINISM 339 {1999) (highlighting various problems in child welfare proceedings).
. S8. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
.
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permanenceofthe loss she faces.''59 Justice Ginsburg placed M.L.B.'s situation
in the latter category.60
In discussing the doctrinal foundations ofGriffin v. Illinois,61 Mayer v. City
ofChicago,61 and related cases, Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that both due
process and equal protection concerns were present and that in the Griffin line
ofcases,'" [d]ueprocess and equal protection principles converge. "'63 ML.B.'s

59. M..L.B., 519 U.S. at 119 (citation and footnote omitted). Justice Ginsburg's language in
that sentence and throughout the opinion is laden with emotion; Justice Ginsburg then asks how
much process is due before the state forever''brand[s] (her]unfit for affiliation with her children."
/d. at 119. ''Nothing in the Chancellor's order describes the evidence, however, or otherwise
reveals precisely why M.L.B. was decreed, forevermore, a stranger to her children." /d. at 108.
Justice Ginsburg refers to the lower court's decision as a "stem judgment." /d. al 122. M.L.B. is
..endeavoring to defend against the State's destruction ofher family bonds, and to resistthe brand
associated with a parental unfitness adjudication." /d. at 125. As the majority opinion's
emotionally laden language may imply a particularly strong, gender-based bond between mothers
and their children, it is interesting to consider whether the decision would have come out
differently had MLB. been a man trying to stop the adoption ofhis children by his ex-wife's new
husband, rather than a woman trying to stop the adoption of her children by her ex-husband's new
wife. On the other hand, the rights of fathers to parent children born to their wives are deeply
embedded in traditional family law. See generally Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130
(1989) (plurality opinion) (noting a husband has Uberty interest in raising child born to his wife,
although child is probably not biologically related to husband). Therefore, as the children were
bom "in wedlock," a hypothetical male would have the force of this tradition behind him. Even
more interesting is whether the decision would have come out differently had M.L.B. been a man
who had never nwried the mother ofthe children and who was trying to stop their adoption by
his ex-girlfriend's new husband. The Supreme Court's precedents in this area have "protected the
rights ofunwed fathers when they have lived with or established a substantial relationship with
their children, unless the unwed father is asserting rights against an 'intact' family... Naomi R.
Cahn, Models ofFamily Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1225, 1237 (1999) (footnote omitted).
See generally, Laurence C. Nolan, "Unwed Children" and Their Parents Before the Unlled
Stales Supreme Court from Levy to Michael H: Unlikely Participants In Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 28 CAP. U. L. REv. 1 (1999} (explaining that unwed fathers do have a liberty
interest in parent-child relationships). for an unwed father who had treated his visitation the way
ML.B. may have, see text accompanying notes 105-13, it is possible that the Court would not
have been so sensitive to the meaning and consequences ofterminating his parental rights. This
possibility is supported by the fact that a plurality of the Court recently upheld an additionnl
proof-of-paternity requirement for citizenship when the citizen parent ofa child who is born out
of-wedlock and abroad is the child's father, as opposed to the child's mother, against an equal
protection challenge. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 424 (1998).
60. The Court indicated that it was "[g]uided by Lassiter and Santosky, and other decisions
acknowledging the primacy ofthe parent-child relationship .•.•" M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 120. The
additional cases "acknowledging the primacy of the parent-child relationship" were Stanley v.
illinois, 405 U.S. 645,651 (1972} andMeyerv. Nebraslw, 262 U.S. 390,399 (1923). M..L.B., 519
U.S. at 120.
61. 351 u.s. 12 (1956).
62. 404 u.s. 189 {1971).
63. M..L.B., 519 U.S. at 120 (quotingBeardenv. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983)). Justice
Ginsburg noted, "Tile equal protection concern relates to the legitimacy offencing out would-be
appellants based solely on their inability to pay core costs. The due process concern homes in on
the essential fairness of the state..ordered proceedings anterior to adverse stale action." Jd.
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claim "heavily" rested on an equal protection framework "for ... due process
does not independently require that the State provide a right to appeal.'~
Without explicitly stating that there is no due process basis for the decision,
Justice Ginsburg sta~ "We place this case within the framework established
by our past decisions in this area. In line with those decisions, we inspect the
character and intensity ofthe individual interest at stake, on the one hand, and
the State's justification for its exaction, on the other."6S Again, the parent's
individual interest is paired against the State's exaction.
ML.B.'s individual interests were significant.66 She faced "forced
dissolution of her parental rights.•»67 The loss of parental rights would be
permanent: "In contrast to loss of custody, which does not sever the parent
child bond, parental status termination is 'irretrievabl[y] destructi[ve]' ofthe
most fundamental family relationship.'~ Further, ''the risk of error ... is
considerable.•t69
Turning from M.L.B.'s interest, the majority considered the state's
'~ustification for its exaction."70 The only interest of the state that was
considered was its financial interest in "offsetting the costs of its court
system."71 Justice Ginsburg found that "in the tightly circumscribed category
ofparental status termination cases, appeals are few, and not likely to impose
an undue burden on the State."n Although state civil fees, such as filing fe~
generally are examined only for rationality, there are two exceptions: fees
involving the right to participate in political processes, and fees limiting access
to judicial processes in cases "criminal or 'quasi criminal in nature. , 73 Justice
Ginsburg placed termination of parental rights decrees in the quasi criminal

(citations omitted). She further noted, "A 'precise rationale' has not been composed because cases
ofthis order 'cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis."' !d. (citations
omitted).
64. Jd. (citation omitted).
65. ld. at 120-21 (citation o_mitted).
66. M.L.B.'s interests were as strong as those ofthe "'impecunious medical student»• in
Mayu. Id. at 121 (quoting Mayer, 404 U.S. at 197). Justice Ginsburg noted that in Mayer the
student did not face jail, but ''the conviction .•. could affect his professional prospects and,
possibly, even bar him from the practice ofmedicine." /d. (citing Mayer, 404 U.S. at 197). Justice
Ginsburg further noted in Mayer that the state's ''pocketbook interest in advance payment for a
transcript •.. was tmimpressive when measured against the stakes for the defendanL" Jd. (citing
Mayu, 404 U.S. atl97).

67. Id.
68. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Santos/cy, 455 U.S. at 753).
69. M.LB., 519 U.S. at 121. Justice Ginsburg noted that "of the eight reported appellate
challenges to Mississippi trial court termination orders from 1980 through May 1996, three were
reverled by the Mississippi Supreme Court for failure to meet the 'clear and convincing' proof
standard." Id. at 109 n.3.
70. See id. at 122-24.
71. /d. atl22.
72. /d. (citations omitted).
73. ld. at 124 (quoting Mayer v. City ofChicago, 404 U.S. 189; 196 (1971)).
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category, namely 'the categocy where the State cannot '"bolt the door to equal
justice."'74 Even though the fee requirement may have been rational, the
financial justification was unimpressive when measured against the rights at
stake for M.L.B.75
Following the United States Supreme Court's decision, the Mississippi
Supreme Court reinstated M.L.B.'s appeal, required that she be allowed to
proceed without fees, and ordered that the record in the case be transcribed.76
Based on a detailed review of the Chancellor's trial level decision, the
Mississippi Court ofAppeals on remand held that M.L.B. 's parental rights had
been improperly terminated." According to that court, under Mississippi law
S.L.J. must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence thatM.L.B. actually
had abandoned her children, and as the evidence did not prove abandonment,
her parental rights should not have been tenninated.78 This conclusion was
upheld by the Mississippi Supreme Court in April 2000.79 Thus, almost six
years after M.L.B. 's parental rights had been terminated, her rights were
reinstated so that she could have visitation with her children.
III. DISCUSSION
Four aspects ofthe Supreme Court's decision are particularly significant.
One is the distinction the court makes between judicial decisions concerning
termination ofparental rights andjudicial decisions concerning child custody.80
Second is the framework applied to the situation, which assumes that the
concept ofa "risk oferror'' is meaningful and that adversarial decisionmaking

74. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 124 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 24 (1955)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
15. In his dissent, Justice Thomaswarned that the decision would result in "greaterdemands

on the States to provide free assistance to would-be appellants in all manner of civil cases
involving interests that cannot, based.on the test established by the majority, be distinguished from
the admittedly important interest at issue here." /d. at 130. Justice Thomas pointed out that it was
not clear whether the decision rested only on equal protection orhad due process aspects, and he
asserted that ifneither clause provided the basis for the free transcript, a combination ofthe two
clauses did not either. /d. He characterized the decision as dealing with ''the new-found
constitutional right to free transcripts in civil appeals." /d. at 129.
76. M.L.B. v. S.LJ., No. 97-CA-00929-COA, 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 299, at *3 (Miss.
Ct. App. May 18, 1999).
77. /d. at *40.
78. See id. at *40. Although the Chancellor had found that there bad been "substantial
erosion" in the relationship, which was one ofthe requirements for tenninating parental rights,
he did not also conclude that her actions constituted "abandonment," as required by Mississippi
law; moreover, the facts that the Chancellor found did not constitute "abandonment." Jd. at *29,
40. See infra text accompanying notes 110-13.
79. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., No. 97-CI'-00929-SCT, 2000 Miss. LEXIS 93, at *1·2 (April20,
2000).
80. See M.L.B. v. S.LJ., 519 U.S. 102, 127-28 (1996); infra Partill.A. See generallysupra
note '11 (defining "child custody decisionmaking").
·
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is the best way to reach accurate and fair results.81 Third is the lack of
distinction between stepparent adoptions and other adoptions.82 Fourth is the
exclusion of the interests of children from the framework.83 Each will be
discussed below.
A. The Distinction Between Decisions Concerning Child Custody and
Termination of Parental Rights: For Indigent Parents, Often the
Difference Between the Two is Not Very Great

The majority opinion inML.B. sharply distinguishes between adjudication
of child custody disputes between parents and termination of parental rights
adjudication.... The state's role in these two situations, by implication, is also
significantly different. Justice Ginsburg noted that "[i]n contrast to loss of
custody, which does not sever the parent-child bond, parental status termination
is 'irretrievabl[y] destructi[ve]' ofthe most fundamental family relationship."85
Family law enumerates various differences as well. Decisions terminating
parental rights must be based on clear and convincing evidence,86 while
parents' disputes over child custody, like other civil cases, are decided based
on a preponderance ofthe evidence.87 There is no right to counsel for parents
in custody cases, yet there is a right to counsel for parents in many tennination
of parental rights cases.81 Child custody orders are modifiable,89 while orders
for the termination of parental rights are not.90 However, as explained below,
the two situations are not necessarily different with respect to the impact of
custody orders on indigent parents.
Justice Ginsburg noted that unlike tennination orders, custody orders are
''matters modifiable at the parties' will or based on changed circumstances,"91
and indeed, custody orders can be modified in those instances.92 However, this

81. See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 120-21; infra Partill.B.
82. See M.L.B., 519 U.S. 116 n.8; infra Part ill.C..
83. See infra Part m.D.
84. See M.LB., 519 U.S. at 121, 127-28.
85. /d. at 121 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (alteration in
original)).
86. Santoskyv. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,747-48 (1982)(decisions tenninatingparental rights
must be based on clear and convincing evidence).
87. See, e.g., Lipsey v. Lipsey, 755 So. 2d 564, 565 {Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that the
moving party in an action to modify custody must prove its case by a preponderance of the
evidence).
88. Lassiter v. Dept ofSoc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981) (deciding the rigbtto counsel
in tennination ofparental rights cases depends on character and complexity ofcase).
89. See 2 HOMERH. CLARK, JR., THELAWOFDoMESTICRELATIONS IN1HEUNITEDSTATES
§ 20.9, at 547 (Practitioner's ed., 2d. ed. 1987).
90. See id. § 21.2, at 572.
91. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 127-28 (1996).
92. CLARK, supra note 89, § 20.9, at 547.

at
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distinction may notoe as great as it seems. In fact, if one parent loses custody
to the other parent in a child custody dispute, it is unlikely that the custody
order will ever be modified "at the parties' will," since the winner will be
unlikely to agree to modify it Further, a court's ability to modify custody
decisions is more theoretical than real, particularly when people cannot afford
counsel.93 Moreover, when people cannot afford counsel, enforcement of
custody decisions through contempt or other means is often impossible.94 By
the time a termination ofparental rights proceeding is brought and the indigent
parent obtains court-appointed counsel in the termination proceeding,95 the
relationship between the parent and child may already be damaged or
destroyed.
Scrutiny of the facts of ML.B. raises questions along these lines.
According to the Supreme Court's opinion, the father's custody ofthe children
was decided by agreement between the parties upon divorce.96 The children
93. People oflow and moderate income levels have difficulty obtaining attorneys for civil
matters. See generally ROY W. REEsE & CAROLYN A. ELDRED,. R:EPORTONTHELEGAL NEEDS
AMONGLoW-INCOMEANDMODERAlE-INCOMEHOUSatOLDS: SUMMARYOFFINDINGSFROMTHE
COMPREHENSIVELEGALNEEDS STIJDY (1994), reprinted in FINDINGS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE
LEGALNEEDS STIJDY 41-44 (AMERICANBARAsSOCIATION 1994) (finding low-income families
are less likely to seek counsel than moderate-income families and noting "a feeling that nothing
could be done" was ''most frequently cited in low-income situations"). Attorneys generally refuse
to represent parties in a divorce without a substantial upfront retainer. CLARK, supra note 89,
§ 17.2, at 234. This retainer requirement of course would be applied to persons seeking
modifications of divorce decrees. Although domestic relations statutes often provide for fee
shifting based on the financial capabilities ofthe litigants;CLARK, supra note 89, § 17.2, at233,
fee-shifting is unwieldy in practice and often does not ensure that the poorer spouse (usually the
woman) receives competent representation. See Linda J. Ravdin & Kelly J. Capps, Alternative
Pricing of Legal Services in a Domestic Relations Practice: Choices and Ethical
Considerations, 33 FAM. L.Q. 387, 409{1999); see also Melody Kay Fuller, Unbundling Family
Law Practice Creates Pro Bono Opportunities, COLO. LAW., Sept 1998, at 29, 30 (noting a
shortage of pro bono attorneys to represent parties in family law cases); Jeannette F. Swent,
Gender Bias at the Heart ofJustice: ,An Empirical Study ofState Task Forces, 6 S. CAL. R.Bv.
L. & WoMEN's STUD. 1, 58·59 (1996) (summarizing findings ofgender bias studies that women
have particular difficulty finding attorneys in divorce because oflack offunds); Rosalie R. Young,
The SearchforCounse/: Perception ofApplicantsforSubsidizedLega/Assistance, 36 BRANDEIS
J. FAM. L. 551, 551-60, 572-74 {1998) {describing experiences ofindigent people who cannot
obtain attorneys and describing the particular need ofwomen for counsel in divorce and other
family cases).
94. See sources cited supra note 93.
95. Despite the court's limited requirement for counsel in tennination of parental rights
proceedings in Lassiter v. Department ofSocial Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981), state legislatures
have "continued to expand the statutory right to counsel" in such proceedings. Rosalie R. Young,
The Right to Appointed Counsel in Termination ofParental Rights Proceedings: The States'
Response to Lassiter, 14 ToURo L. REv. 247, 273-274 (1997).
96. ML.B., 519 U.S. at 107. There is no infonnation in the Court's opinion about why the
father had custody upon divorce or details ofthe circumstances ofthe agreement. The subsequent
Mississippi Court of Appeals' decision reveals that the divorce decree forbade M.L.B. from
exercising her visitation in the presence of J.B., who was her husband at the time of the
Chaneellor's decision. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., No. 97-CA-00929-COA, 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 299,
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lived with their father for almost a year and a half before the petition to
terminate was filed. 97 The petition claimed that ML.B. had not maintained
reasonable visitation.91 However, once the petition was filed and M.L.B.
obtained a court-appointed lawyer in the termination case, she counterclaimed
for full custody and alleged that the father bad notprovided herwith reasonable
visitation as provided in the divorce decree.99
But prior to her counterclaim to the termination petition, M.L.B. had not
taken steps to modify or enforce the judgment that she, in theory, could have
obtained under Mississippi law. For example, she could have filed a motion to
change the terms of the divorce judgment so that she would get more or
different visitation rights. 100 Alternatively, she could have filed a motion for
contempt or enforcement of the judgment alleging that she was being denied
visitation. 101
There is no way ofknowing from any ofthe opinions exactly why M.L.B.
did not take advantage of any of these options during the year and a half
between the divorce judgment and the filing of the termination petition.
However, some clues may be gleaned from the Chancellor's opinion. First,
M.L.B., who had an eleventh grade education, worked various jobs during this
period. 102 After an eight year marriage, she received only an automobile and
two quilts from the divorce. 103 It is reasonable to infer that herjobs during this
period did not pay high wages and that she did not have funds to hire a lawyer
to try to enforce or modify the custody order during this period. 104 Second,
M.L.B. and her new husband had significant problems which may have
interfered with her efforts to visit or to enforce the visitation provisions ofthe
divoroe decree. The parties were divorced in June 1992, and M.L.B. married
J.B., her boyfriend prior to the divorce, 1os in October 1992.106 At some

at •6. &e infra notes 104-09.
97. M.L.B., 519 U.S. 11107.
98. ld.
.
99. /d.
100. See Miss. CODEANN.§ 93-5-23 (1994 & Supp. 2000)(allowing the court on petition,
after issuing a custody decision, to change the decree and make such new decrees as the case may
require).
101. See MISS. CooEANN. § 93-5-81 (1991) (giving the chancery court power to punish
violations ofits orders through contempt proceedings). Contempt proceedings have been used to
enforce visitation orders. See, e.g., Saunders v. Saunders, 724 So. 2d 1132, 1135-36 (Miss. Ct.
App. 1998) (upholding lower court's determination that ex-wife was in contemptofcourt's order
on visitation).
102. M.L.B. v. S.W.. No. 97-CA-00929-COA, 1999 Miss. App. LEXlS 299, at •16, 20
(Miss. Ct. App. May 18, 1999).Herplaces ofemployment included Timber Craft, Witbank's Bar
B-Que, Rest Haven and Ripley Manor./d. at •t7. She is now a certified nurse assistant/d.
103. /d.
104. See Cl.ARK, supra note 89, § 17.2, at 233-34.
105. M .L.B., 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 299, at •7.
106. /d. at *6, 20. S.LJ. remarried in September 1992. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 107.
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unspecified time, J.B. was convicted ofan assault on a police officer and had
spent time injail. 107 After he physically and emotionallyabused M.L.B., she left
him for about a year.108 Thus, during the year and a half between the divorce
(June 1992) and when the petition was filed (November 1993), she married a
man who abused her and then left him.109 When the petition was filed, she was
apparently separated from him.
There are factual disputes concerning M.L.B.'s visitation and attempts at
visitation during this period. ML.B. claimed that S.L.J. hung up the phone on
her when she tried to speak with her children. 110 S.L.J. claimedthat M.L.B. did
not frequently visitm-at times he did not know where she was 112-and that
she hung up the phone when he called. 113 It is possible that M.L.B. could have
had more visitation during this period, but it is impossible to know whether
M.L.B. would have taken the necessary steps to enforce or change the divorce
judgment had she had ready access to an attorney. There is no way to know for
certain whether the counterclaim in the parental rights case seeking full custody
was made in order to try to strengthen her strategic position, 114 or for some
other reason. 11s

107. M.L.B., 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 299, at *17.
108. ld. at *20. ML.B.leftJ.B. between roughly June 1993 and July 1994. /d.
109. The petition was filed in November 1993. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 107.
110. M.L.B., 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 299, at *19. According to the Chancellor, M.L.B.
testified that the last time she had the children with her was October 15, 1993, which was over
a year before the final hearing prior to the tennination.ld. at *17-18. M.L.B. visited the children
at her sister's house in the fall of 1994 and on other occasions when the children were staying at
her sister's bouse.ld. at *16-18. M.L.B.'s sister testified that M.L.B. tried to see her children,
bought gifts for them, and that sometimes the children called M.L.B.Id. at *16. M.L.B. testified
that S.L.J. would not allow her to deliver gifts for the children. ld. at *17. M.L.B. testified that
S.U. ''would not allow her visitation," and so she stopped paying child support. Id. at *19. S.L.J.
testified that the last time he believedM.L.B. saw the children was in early August 1994, at their
aunt's bouse.ld. at *9. S.L.J. teStified he dropped the children offwith their aunt (M.L.B.'s sister)
so they could visit with their mother, but that M.L.B. had come by only one time and stayed for
about thirty minutes.ld. at *10. S.L.J. also stated that at one point after the divorce he left the
children for a week with M.L.B.'s sister so that M.L.B. could visit with them but that M.L.B.
"only visited about twice during that week." Jd. at *11, 21. This testimony ofS.L.J. is not clearly
rebutted in the Chancellor's summary ofM.L.B.'s or her sister's testimony./d. at *22-28.11 is
difficult to tell from the Chancellor's opinion bowmuch visitation was attempted and bowmuch
visitation actually took plac:e.ld.
111. Jd. at •s.
112. ld. at •s.
113. ld. at •t9.
114. A possible strategic reason for the counterclaim is the possibility that a judge would
be less likely to terminate her parental rights ifshe claimed she actually wanted full custody and
not just visitation .
liS. After the counterclaim was filed, M.L.B.'s position changed. At the Chancellor's
hearing, M.L.B. testified that she was only seeking visitation, not custody. M.L.B., 1999 Miss.
· App. LEXIS 299, at *20-21. See infra note 158.
·
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In a practical sense, for the indigent parent losing custody, a judgment of
custody for the other parent is not always ver:y different from a judgment
tenninating parental rights. While the court orders are theoretically modifiable,
without the assistance of counsel they may in practice be almost final
adjudications of parental rights. Similarly, while orders are theoretically
enforceable by contempt or other means, retaining counsel to handle such a
fact-intensive, time-consuming matter is likely to be extremely difficult if a
litigant lacks substantial funds. 116 When a termination petition eventually is
filed and counsel is appointed by the court for an indigent parent, the
relationship between that parent and the child may already be thoroughly
undermined. Thus, the state's role in the two contexts may be viewed as more
similar than different
The state's role in deciding custody disputes between parents is certainly
not minor or incidental. As in termination of parental rights cases, it is
tremendously consequential. If the fundamental reason for the free transcript
requirement ofML.B. is that the challenged state action deeply affects parental
rights, logically there should be similar requirements in custody cases and other
family law cases. 117 In his dissent, Justice Thomas makes the same point with
alarm.u• Although the extension of ML.B. and Lassiter v. Department of
Social Servic~ 119 to child custody cases involving indigent parents is unlikely,
nonetheless, as noted above, strong arguments exist for such an extension. 120

116. See supra no~ 93.
The same argument applies to the court•s counsel requirement of Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981). Custody issues cannot be clearly separated
from visitation issues, as the flip side ofacustody order often is the section pertaining to visitation
for the non-custodial parent The plurality and concurrences in Troxel v. Granville show that
certain visitation orders can be unconstitutional, although the decision does not specify the exact
circwnJtanoes where such orders will be unconstitutional. See supra no~ 9. See also Palmore v.
Sidoti, ~66 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1984) (holding that a custody decision based in part on race was
an unooostitutional denial ofequal pro~ction). Since the Troxel pluraJity•s decision was narrow
and the ooncUil'eD.ces were splintered, the exact significance of the holding is debatable. But
Troul oertainly does not say the custody or visitation orders are constitutionally equivalent to
~nnination ofparental rights orders.
118. In his dissent, Justice Thomas claims the principles underlying the m&jority' s decision
do not necessarily limit it to the oon~xt of~nnination ofparental rights, but could be extended
to other contexts such as transcripts for custody appeals. M.L.B. v . S.W ., 519 U.S. 102, 142
117.

(1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting).

119. 452 u.s. 18 (1981).
120. Some policy arguments wouJd call for a re~tion ofthe current system. One argument
is that broadened access to lawyers may breed more destructive litigation. However, under the
current system, the party with the most funds has the most access to lawyers and thus the grea~r
opportunity to engage in destructive litigation, which is highly problematic. Some also may argue
that in a world of fini~ resources and massive child poverty, using public resources to enable
parents to engage in custody battles at the government' s expense is not a wise use of these
l'C80Uroes. However, one could respond that the current situation is untenable and that resources
· are not 10 scarce.
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B. Risk ofE"or and the Advocacy System

This section will discuss and question two assumptions found in the
Supreme Court's decision in ML.B. and in its other termination of parental
rights decisions. 121 First is the idea that "risk of error" 122 is a meaningful
concept in the context of parental rights terminations. Second is the idea that
the advocacy system, the "equal contest ofopposed interests,"123 is the bestway
to resolve disputes in this arena.
The termination of parental rights in ML.B. and other opinions124 is
governed by the due process framework established in Mathews v. Eldridge. 125
A balancing test is used to evaluate whether the state's process for terminating
individual interests is sufficient to support the Court's decision.126 The Court
must balance the individual's interest, the risk oferroneous deprivation ofthat
interest, and the state' s interest.127 Justice Ginsburg notes in ML.B. the "risk of
error ... is considerable" in the context oftermination ofparental rights.128 This
statement assumes that there is a correct outcome and an incorrect outcome in
parental rights termination cases and that the appeal process determines
whether the trial outcome was correct
The idea ofrisk oferror in parental rights termination cases ties in with
basic ideas about our adversary system, as articulated inLassiterv. Department
of Social Services. 129 The Lassiter Court stated "[O]ur adversary system
presupposes [that] accurate and just results are most likely to be obtained
through the equal contest ofopposed interests." 130 This statement presupposes
that accurate results can be reached in all areas of the law, including
termination of parental rights as in the context of Lassiter. It further

121. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Lassiter, 452 U.S. 18.
122. "Risk oferror'' is a phrase used by Justice Ginsburg in the M.L.B. decision. M.L.B.,
519 U.S. at 121.
123. "Equal contest ofopposed interests" is a phrase used by Justice Stewart in Lassiter.
See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 28.
·
124. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. 745; Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18
(examining the right ofindigents to receive appointment ofcounsel in tennination proceedings).
125. 424 U.S. 319,334-35 (1976) (identifying three factors to be considered in determining
whether administrative procedures are constitutionally sufficient: the private interest affected by
the offical action, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest, and the government's
interest); seeSantosky,455 U.S. at 754-70 (applying the Mathews framework); Lassiter, 452U.S.
at 27-31 {referencing the Mathews framework) .
126. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
127. ld
128. M.L.B. v. S.LJ., 519 U.S. 102, 121 (1996). This is based on the fact that three out of
eight parental termination cases appealed in Mississippi between 1980 and 1996 were reversed
on appeal for failure to meet the "clear and convincing evidence'' standard.Jd. at 109 n.3 (citation
omitted).
129. 452 u.s. 18,27-31.
130. /d. at 28. Lassiter also discussed a parent's interest in the "accuracy and justice" ofa
parental rights tennination decision. /d. at 27.
·
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presupposes that all issues within the scope ofour adversary system are based
on binary, opposed interests. This assumption is also at the heart ofthe ML.B.
decision.
The notion of a risk of error is somewhat puzzling in the context of
termination ofparental rights because the standards are vague, 131 and therefore
the application ofthe standards to the facts is murky in many instances. 132 The
judicial detennination is very different from that involving application of a
clear rule. 133 The tennination of parental rights context is radically different
from the termination of social security benefits context, seen in Mathews v.
Eldridge. 134 In Santosky v. Kramer 135 the Court noted that the substantive
standards for tenninating parental rights are imprecise and "leave
derenninations unusually open to the subjective values ofthe judge."136 The
Court used this observation and other factors to justify a higher standard of
proof for tennination ofparental rights proceedings than had previously been
required. 137 But if you are requiring clear and convincing evidence of
something that is vague, the result is not necessarily more accurate than
requiring a preponderance of the evidence of something that is vague.
Similarly, ifyou require a right to a transcript in order to appeal a detennination
that is vague, you will not necessarily gain any more accuracy than if you do
not possess such a transcript Thus, the notion ofa risk oferror is somewhat
problematic in this area.

131. See CLARK, supra note 89, § 21.6, at 625 (noting that definitions in termination of
parental rights statutes are tautological); id. § 21.7, at 632-33 (noting several reasons for the
vague standards: definitions ofgrounds for involuntary termination ofparental rights vary widely
betwcea states, a variety of circumstances exist where tennination is ordered, stare decisis has
limited applicability, and courts have widely divergent approaches to similar statutes).
132. The difficulty ofdetermining whether trial courts have made proper decisions in the
tennination ofparental rights areas is illustrated by the Mississippi Court ofAppeals ruling in
M.L.B. which was a divided vote of7-3. M.L.B. v. SL.J., No. 97-CA-00929-COA, 1999 Miss.
App. LEXIS 299 (M.iss . Ct. App. May 18, 1999). The Mississippi Supreme Court decision
atlinning the Mississippi Court ofAppeals decision was a divided vote of6-2. M.L.B. v. S.W.,
No. 97-CI'-00929-scr, 2000 Miss. LEXIS 93 (April20, 2000). The various opinions differed
greatly oonoem.ing the significance ofthe facts found by the Chancellor and the interpretation of
the legal standard. Thus, one may say that the appeal process corrected the errors ofthe lower
oourt, but one may also argue that the errors ofthe lower court still are not so clear.
133. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Privole Law Adjudication, 89 HARv.
L. REv. 1685, 1687, 1688-89 (1976) {noting that rules in contrasttostandard.s offer certainty and
reduce arbitrary judicial action).
134. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In Mathews, the court noted the continued receipt of social
security benefits was "astatutorily created 'property' interest protected by the Fl.fth AmendmenL"
/d. at 332.
135. 455 u.s. 745 {1982).
136. /d. at 762 (citing Smith v. Org. ofFoster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 835 n.26 {1977)). See
gtnera/ly Appell, supra note 57, at 580 {detennining "the state,s reasons for both initial and
continuing intervention are ill-defined and maternally-focused").
·
137. /d. at 764.
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Second, the assumptionfound in Lassiter and ML.B. thatan"equal contest
of opposed interests" is the best way to reach "accurate and just results" is
suspect in the area of family law and, increasingly, in law generally. 131
Mediation, which is increasingly prevalent in family law, questions this
assumption at a fundamentallevel. 139 It is based on the idea that there are many
instances where the best way to reach positive outcomes is precisely notto view
conflicts as the equal contest of opposed interests, but to look for mutually
acceptable resolutions. 140 The trend toward mediation began with family law,
where mediation is most commonly required. 141
In tennination of parental rights cases, the equal contest of opposed
interests ofstate and parent may be the least likely route to a positive result for
children. The decisionmaking process, with its delays, intrusive processes, and
painful situations can traumatize children. 142 A less confrontational, less
absolute approach might work better in most circumstances for all involved. 10
Similarly, an equal contest of opposed interests of parents may be the worst
possible way ofreaching positive results in child custody cases. 144
The idea that the risk of error concept fits uneasily with tennination of
parental rights litigation also applies to child custody litigation. Yet, risk of

138. See generally 1NANCYH.RoGERs&CiwoA.McEWEN,MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY
& PRACTICE (2d. ed. 1994).

139. See generally id.
140. See generally id.
141. /d. § 7.02, at 4. Mediation is seen by some as a response to the indeterminacy ofthe
best interests ofthe child standard. See CLARK, supra note 89, § 15.2, at 163. Several states have
programs for mediating termination ofparental rights cases. See Sinden, supra note 57, at 355·58.
142. In addition to these concerns about the decisionmak:ing process, there are conceptual
problems with always viewing the issue as solely concerning the state versus parents' interests
without considering children's infetests. See infra Part ID.D.
143. However, concerns have also been raised that the mediation process reinforces power
dynamics that can be undercut somewhat by the fonnality of the litigation process. See, e.g..
Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce MediaJion and the Politics ofPower, 40 BUFF.
L. REv. 441, 445 (1992) (noting that mediation empowers "the already more powerful husband"
in divorce proceeding to the disadvantage of wife); Trine Grillo, The Mediation Alternative:
Process Dangersfor Women, tOO YALEW.1S45,1549 (1991) (concludingmandatory mediation
does not provide a more humane or just alternative to the adversarial system); Scott H. Hughes,
Elizabeth's Story: Exploring Power Imbalances in Divorce Mediation, 8Gro. J. LEOAL Enucs
553, 519-80 (1995) (noting that while mediation can balance power among spouses, there ore
inherentflaws); Sinden,supra note 57, at 389-91 (noting the effectiveness ofinfonnal procedures
may be lessened by the disparity of power). For a thoughtful analysis advocating fonnal
approaches and critiquing approaches such as mediation, see Sinden, supra note 51, at 355-58.
See also infra Part Ill.C.
144. The author's experience in supervising third year law students in a clinical program,
where students practice family law in Maine Courts for four years, is that the assumption that
contested custody litigation is ternDie for parents and children appears to be universally shared
·
by lawyers, judges, and guardians ad litem.
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error is not discussed in the context of child custody litigation.145 The best
interest ofthe child standard is a very vague concept, which may be one reason
risk oferror is not an explicit consideration. But, ifthe concept ofrisk oferror
is meaningful in one area of children's legal relationships with their
parents--tennination of parental rights-a better explanation is needed as to
why this concept is not meaningful in a related area-<;ustody litigation.
Similarly, the idea that an equal contest ofopposed interests may not actually
lead to positive results in parental rights termination cases also applies to child
custody disputes. But ifan equal contest ofopposed interests indeed is the best
way to make decisions about tennination of parental rights, a more robust
explanation is needed as to why this model works for litigation of parental
rights1erminationbut not for child custody litigation. Concomitantly, a stronger
explanation is needed to explain why the constitutional protections that apply
to litigation oftennination ofparental rights do not apply to parental disputes
about child custody.
Concerning parental rights tennination litigation, important questions arise
concerning the appropriateness ofthe binary rights advocacy framework in all
instances.146 Risk oferror may not be a sufficiently meaningful concept in this
context, and the binary advocacy framework may also be inadequate. Other
approaches such as mediation and changing the requirements for adoption, as
discussed below, should be considered.
C. The Lack ofDistinction Between Stepparent Adoptions and Other
Adoptions

Justice Ginsburg and Justice Thomas characterizedML.B. v. S.L.J. simply
as a termination of parental rights case. Neither Justice seemed to view
stepparent adoption, which constitutes a large proportion of adoptions in the
United States,147 as significant to the decision. Even though the state was not
taking the children away from a custodial parent and placing them with
strangers, "the challenged state action remains essentially the same: M.L.B.
resists the imposition of an official decree extinguishing, as no power other

145. See MAHONEY, supra note 12, at 124; see, e.g., Garskav. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d357, 363
(W.Va. 1981) (introducing a more determinate "primary caretaker" standard in place ofbest
interests standard); cj. CLARK. supra note 89, § 20.4, at 494-517. For example, in Troxelv.
Granville, Justice KeMedy's dissent noted that "[t]he best interests ofthe child standard has at
times been criticized as indeterminate, leading to unpredictable results." Troxel, 120 S. Ct. 2054,
2079 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRlNCIPLES OF 1lfE LAW OF
FAMILY DISSOLUTION 2 & n.2 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1998). Yet, as discussed above, the
standards for tenninating parental rights also are vague. See supra text accompanying notes 131,
135-36.
146. For additional discussion ofthe framework concerning the best interests ofthe child,
see infra Part ill.D.
147. MAHONEY, supra note 12, at 161.
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than the State c~ her parent-child relationships." 141 In a sense this concept is
true-the law of Mississippi and other states treats stepparent adoption the
same as other adoptions by requiring the termination of parental rights ofthe
noncustodial parent before the adoption can take place. 149
However, different people affected by the controversy may have varying
perspectives as to whether the challenged state action is essentially the same in
this and other contexts. For example, ML.B. may view the state action as
essentially the same whether the children are being placed with a stranger or
with her former husband ofeightyears and his new wife. Nonetheless, this does
not classify the state action as essentially the same from all perspectives. For
example, from the children's perspective, as articulated by the guardian ad
litem, the proposed state action apparently was not objectionable as the
guardian ad litem did not appeal the Chancellor's decision.•so Moreover, the
state action in allowing stepparent adoptions is very different from a state
action where a parent's rights are terminated so that the child may be placed
with strangers. In ML.B. the children were being placed with one person, their
father, with whom they had a fully formed parental relationship and with whom
they had been living their entire lives. They were also being placed with his
new wife, with whom they had been living for at least a year. The state did not
intrude on an intact family and seize the children or destroy bonds that were
unfrayed. The state ofMississippi in ML.B. chose one parent over the other,
which is not unlike the general outcomes ofcustody cases.
However, the situation ofM.L.B., S.L.J., and their children raises questions
about whether complete termination of parental rights should be required in
stepparent and other kinds ofadoptions. The traditional adoption fiction of a
child being transferred to anew family, with all traces ofthe child's old family
being obliterated, does not fit this situation nor many other current situations.u•
The children were six and eight years old when the petition to terminate was
filed. 1s2 The petition did not allege abuse, but claimed that M.L.B. had failed
to visit regularly and had failed to pay child support. 153 The children may have
formed important bonds with M.L.B. that would be against their best interests ·
to totally sever. It may also have been in the children's best interest for there to
be a legally recognized relationship between them and their stepmother,

148. M.L.B. v. S.W., 519U.S. 10~ 117 n.8 (1996).
149. See discussion supra note 19.
ISO. See M.L.B. v. S.U.. No. 95-853, 1996 WL 587663, at •23, 29 (1996).
151. See Appell. supra note 25, at 1008-13; MAHONEY, supra note 12,81162-63; Mahoney,
supra note 19, at 101.
152. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 107.
153. /d. M.L.B. testified that the reason she stopped paying child support was "because the
plaintiffwould not allow her visitation." M.L.B. v. S.LJ., No. 97:CA-009290-COA, 1999 Miss.
App. LEXIS 299, at •t9.
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J.P.J. 154 Under these circumstances, it is not clear that the law should require
such an absolute termination in all adoptions.155
Various commentators and courts have advocated more flexible options. 156
The Uniform Adoption Act allows for the possibility ofpost-adoption visitation
rights for the former noncustodial parent after a stepparent adoption. 157 For
example, why not allow J.P.J. to adopt the children and still allow M.L.B. and
the children the opportunity to visit one another?158 Why not have an adoption
certificate recognizing J.P.J. as a parent to the children, but not obliterate the
initial birth certificate? Why do we characterize parental rights in this binary
fashion when relationships are more complex than that? The open or
collaborative adoption movement has various proposals allowing for a more
nuanced approach.159
The state's requirement ofabsolute termination is part ofwhat leads to the
perceived needfor constitutional protections. Since the deprivation is complete,
the process that is due is correspondingly greater. If the deprivation had not
been complete, lesser due process protections should beacceptable. Moreover,
this would probably facilitate the adoption process, in stepparent cases and
other cases, by making a consent to termination ofone's parental rights less
absolute and less stigmatizing. Many situations exist where a parent is
genuinely overwhelmed and is willing to allow an ex-partner or foster parents
to adopt the child, but retaining some connection, such as annually receiving

154. Particularly as M.L.B. did not want custody but only wanted visitation, itmight have
made sense to have a legally recognized relationship between the children and their stepmother
in the eventofJ.P.J!s death. See Mahoney, supra note 19, at 108 (noting that prior to adoption.
legal relationship ofstepparent and child is an "uncertain affair," but once adoption is final, rights
and duties of stepparent are the same as those of any other parent). See generally MAHONEY,
supra note 12, at 177-78 (describing the legal consequences ofstepparent adoption).
155. It is similarly unclear why termination needs to be so stigmatizing. Justice Ginsburg
refers repeatedly to the "brand" associated with parental rights terminations. ML.B., S 19 U.S. at
125. She analogizes ~nnination proceedings to criminal misdemeanor convictions. ld a~ 120,
122-23, 125. Justice Ginsburg's tone may imply that they are worse than misdemeanor
convictions./d For a different perspective on this analogy, see Sinden, supra note 57, at 344--50.
156. See, e.g., Appell, supra note 25, at 10 10~55 (discussjng options for open or cooperative
adoptions); MAHONEY, supra note 12, at 161-89 (discussing stepparent adoptions).
157. See Mahoney, supra note 19, at 100.
158. According to the Chancellor, M.L.B.on cross-examination by the guardian ad litem
testified to the following:
She testified that she was not complaining about the children living with
their father, she knows that they are being well taken care of. She was
concerned about the telephone calls and having the right to converse with
her children. She said she had no doubt thatJ.P.J. [the stepmother] loves the
children and she loves them also. Itused to bother her for the children to call
J.PJ. 'mother,' but she now understands. She is willing to pay child support,
provide medical insurance, but she wants visitation.
M.L.B., 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 299, at *20-21.
159. See, e.g., Appell, supra note 25, at 1010-49 (discussing the utility ofopen adoptions
and providing examples ofcooperative adoption practiceS).
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pictures ofthe child, makes the parent's consentto absolute termination ofher
parental rights psychologically possible. 160 The absoluteness ofparental rights
and the rigidity ofthe adoption framework make this kind ofresolution harder.
Legislative and judicial efforts to craft practical solutions for adoption
dilemmas should be applauded.
D. The Continued Invisibility ofChildren

Children are invisible in both Justice Ginsburg's opinion and in the
dissenting opinions. Justice Ginsburg writes that the Court is "[g]uided by
Lassiter and Santosky, and other decisions acknowledging the primacy ofthe
parent-child relationship."161 The Court's references to the "parent-child
relationship, in those decisions indicate an acknowledgment ofthe two-way
nature ofthat relationship: the child's relationship with the parents and the
parents' relationship with the child. However, those decisions only concern the
latter half ofthat relationship: the parents' relationship with their child. The
National Center for Youth Law and other groups filed an amicus curiae brief
urging the Court to consider "not only the fundamental rights ofparents, but the
fundamental rights ofchildren to a parent-child relationship.''162 None ofthe
opinions by the United States Supreme Court or the Mississippi courts mention
this brief. None ofthe Justices acknowledge the invisibility of children163 or
mention the possible effect ofthe decision itself on the children. 164

160. The drafters of the stepparent visitation provisions of the Unifonn Adoption Act
assumed that this would be the case. Mahoney, supra note 19, at 104. This is confinned
anecdotally through various conversations with attorneys and guardians nd litem. E.g.,
Conversation with Cushman Anthony, Esq. and Caroline Gardiner, Esq., in Portland, Me.
(December 7, 1999).
161. M.L.B. v. SLJ., 519 U.S. 102. 120 (1996) (citations omitted).
162. BriefofAmici CuriaeNational CenterforYoulhLawetal. at •4,M.L.B. v. S.W.,S19
U.S. 102 (1996) (No. 95-853), available at1996 WL 294200.
163. Interestingly, in Troxel v. Granville, Justice Stevens• dissent highlights the issue of
children's interests and states that "it seems to me extremely likely that, to the extent parents and
families have fundamental h'berty interests in preserving such intimate relationships, so, too, do
children have these interests, and so, too, must their interests be balanced in the equation [of
parent's interest versus state's interest].'' Troxel, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2072 (2000). Neither the
conCWTeoces nor the dissents explicitly discuss the liberty interests of children. See supra note

9.
164. The litigation probably was confusing for the children, who found that five and n hnlf
years after M.L.B.'s parental rights had been terminated and they had been adopted by their
stepmother, M.L.B.'s parental rights actually had been improperly tenninated and that they had
not been adopted after all. See supra notes 76-79. One cone~ is whether the resolution ofthese
kinds ofcases should take as long as it does.
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As noted above, under Mississippi law, a guardian ad litem has to be
appointed when an adoption involves termination of parental rights. 165 The
guardian is not mentioned in the Court's opinion, but it was mentioned in the
oral argument that a guardian ad litem had been appointed who could have
appealed but did not. 166 One ofthe Justices also suggested that the child's due
process interest was the same as the parent. 167 1n Justice Ginsburg's and Justice
Thomas' framework ofparental rights versus the state, children are remarkably
absent In that sense, the decision is in line with the decisions protecting
parents' rights to raise children, such as Meyer v. Nebraska168 and Pierce v.
Society ofSisters, 169 which are thoughtfully characterized by one commentator
as cases about ownership ofchildren. 170
The issue of how to identify the interests of children is challenging. In
termination proceedings, the issue is framed simply as the interests ofthe state
versus the interests ofthe parent or parents. Although Justice Ginsburg states
that the court must examine "closely and contextually" the governmental
interest advanced in support of the intrusion, 171 the interest advanced by the
state was purely financial. 172 Because the governmental interest was conceived
in such a constricted way, it is not surprising that even a contextual examination
resulted in the dismissal of the government's interest!73 However, in family

165. MISS. CODE ANN.§ 93-15-107(1) (Supp. 2000). See E.M.C. v. S.V.M., 695 So. 2d
576, 581 (Miss. 1997) (holding failure to appoint a guardian ad litem for a child in a tennination
ofparental rights proceeding was reversible error).
166. See supra note 34.
167. A portion of the transcript indicates the Justice's suggestion that the due process
interests for parent and child are the same:
"Q: It is true, is it not, that the child has to be represented separately in the proceeding?
A: Yes, your Honor.
Q: And that' s a matter of due process, too, I would suppose, because the child's rights are as
vitally afmcted as either set ofparents."
See Transcript at *28, M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102(1996) (No. 95-853), available at 1996 WL
587663. This statement is incorrect because the Court has recognized lesser constitutional rlghts
for children. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130.32 (1989)(finding a child does
not have a constitutionally protected interest in maintaining a relationship with the biological
father where that interest conflicts with constitutionally protected interest oflegal father). The
transcriptdoes not identify which Justice asked the question. The author spoke with the attorneys
who were involved with the case and found the attorneys could not remember who asked the
question. Based on Justice Stevens' focus on the children's interest in his dissent, it seems that
the question may have been posed by Justice Stevens.
168. 262 u.s. 390 (1923).
169. 268 u.s. 510 (1925).
170. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and
the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 995, 997 {1992).
171. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996).
172. /d. at 122.
173. The Court in Santosky v. Kramer had already stated that a parent's interest was more
precious than money, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982). Thus, it is unsurprising in M.L.B. that the
parental interest outweighed the state's financial interesL ·
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law, the state is supposed to have a parens patriae interest in the well-being of
children. 174 Thus, in termination proceedings, the state interest should be seen
not simply as an external power opposing the parent but rather as an interest
aligned with the child's interests. However, this is difficult because in some
instances as the interest in the well-being of children is met by having the
children stay with their parents, 17s while in other instances it will be met by
removing them from their parents' custody•176 Nonetheless, to conceive ofthe
state's interest in a particular tennination procedure as merely financial seems
to define the state's interest in an overly constricted fashion.
Legal scholars have been developing theories regarding the associational
rights and interests of children. Gilbert Holmes has cogently argued that
"children's liberty interests in familial relationships" should receive
constitutional recognition. 177 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse argues that "our
attachment to [the] property-based notion ofthe private child cuts offa more
fruitful consideration of the rights of all children to safety, nurture, and
stability, to a voice, and to membership in the national family." 171 Katherine
Federle proposes an empowerment model for children. 179 Bruce and Jonathan
Hafen argue that rights-based frameworks often are inappropriate for
children. 110 MarthaMinow acknowledges that while the language ofrights does
not fit all children's situations, it can be used in some situations to "reach the
realities of children's lives."181 When it does not fit children's lives, other
language must be used "to ta1k about children's needs and society's
responsibilities." 112 A comprehensive theory ofchildren's rights or interests has
not been developed, and it may be that no single theory will be sufficient to

174. See Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct 2054,2072 {2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting
that the state's interest as parens patriae must be balanced against a parent's interest in a child).
The Court's powers to deal both with custody of children as between parents, and protection of
children from parents, derive from the parens patriae power. CLARK, supra note 89, § 20.1, at
476-77.
175. Santosky, 455 u.s: at 766-67.
176. /d. at 767 & n.17. The Santoskymajority claims that the parens patriae interest only
arises "at the disposition phase, after the parents have been found unfit." /d. The dissent
contemplates an earlier alignment between the child's interest and the state's interest and
considers the child's interest separate from the parent's interest/d. at 788 n.l3. The scope and
meaning of the parens patriae power is not clear from the Court's decisions and has not been
clarified by Troxel v. Granville. See supra notes 9, 163, 174.
177. Gilbert A. Holmes, The 1ie That Binds: The Constitutional Right ofChildren to
Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 Mo. L. REv. 358, 385 (I 994).
178. Woodhouse, supra note 170, at 1002, 1112-22.
179. KatherineHuntFederle,LookingAhead: AnEmpowermentPerspectiveonlheRights
ofChildren, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1585, 1585-86 (1995).
180. Bruce C. Hafen & Jonathan 0. Hafen, Abandoning Children to Their Autonomy: 17re
United Nations Convention on the Rights ofthe Child, 37 HAR.v.lNT'L. LJ. 449, 450-S 1{1996).
181. Martha Minow, Children's Rights: Where We've Been, and Where We 're Going, 68
TEMP. L. Rsv. 1573, 1583 {1995).
182. /d.
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deal with all issues ofparents, children, and the state.183 However, we need to
continue to think ofways to include children in the legal frameworks that apply
to their lives.
IV. CONCLUSION

ML.B. v. S.L.J. presents opportunities to analyze the parental rights
framework and the family law issues to which it relates in new ways.
Tennination ofparental rights decisions are not as distinct from child custody
decisions for indigent parents as the law assumes. The adversary framework,
with its assumption ofrisk oferror, may not be the most suitable framework for
termination ofparental rights in all instances, despite its application inML.B.
and other termination of parental rights cases. Modifying traditional adoption
doctrines to recognize different approaches that might work in stepparent and
other adoption contexts is one way to move away from the simplistic
framework we currently use. Last, we need to continue to explore ways to
expand our consideration ofthe children's interests.

183. For example, Emily Buss recently developed a theory for dealing with the free exercise
rights ofchildren, based on an analogy between exercise ofreligious freedom and abortion rights.
Emily Buss, What Does Frieda Yoder Believe?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 53,74-76 (1999). This
framework may be appropriate for children's free exercise rights, but not for custody
determinations. ld. at 76. See generally Sean Ireland, Children as Legal Persons: Defining
Standards Through Judicial Discretion (unpublished paper on file with the author).

